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The Conflict Between Managers and
Shareholders in Diversifying Acquisitions:
A Portfolio Theory Approach
Twenty-five billion dollars were expended in connection with
mergers and acquisitions in the first nine months of 1978.1 One of the
most frequently asserted justifications for these transactions is the
acquiring company's desire to diversify into another industry or pro-
duct line.2 Diversification by a corporation, however, may produce
conflicts3 between management's personal interests and the goal of
maximizing shareholder wealth.4 This Note applies portfolio theory to
managerial behavior in order to demonstrate that decisions to diversify
are influenced by factors other than the maximization of shareholder
wealth. Although empirical evidence suggests that acquisitions may
represent a net transfer of wealth from the shareholders of the acquirer
to the shareholders of the target,5 existing law focuses on protection
of the target's shareholders.0 Since neither current legal remedies nor
the sale of one's shares in the marketplace provide adequate protection
for the shareholders of the acquiring company,7 this Note argues that
the business judgment rule should be suspended in order to permit
thorough judicial scrutiny of the fairness of acquisition decisions.
I. The Nature of the Conflict
The conflict between managers and shareholders arises from two
sources, namely, the additional risks8 that managers incur because of
1. Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 33, col. 2.
2. See Salter & Weinhold, Diversification via acquisition: creating value, HARV. Bus.
Rav., July-Aug. 1978, at 166. For examples of executives' statements offering diversifica-
tion as the primary justification for merger, see Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1978, at 5, col. I
(proposed Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. merger with Borg-Warner Corp.); id., Nov. 22,
1978, at 3, col. 2 (proposed Avon Products, Inc. merger with Tiffany & Co.).
3. See generally S. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY 133-49 (1968);
Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June
1963, at 116.
4. Maximization of shareholder wealth has long been accepted in economic theory as
the proper goal of management in conducting the affairs of a publicly owned corpora-
tion. J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 6-9 (4th ed. 1977); cf. Hethering-
ton, Fact and Legal Theory: Shareholders, Managers, and Corporate Social Responsibility,
21 STAN. L. REv. 248, 250-74 (1969) (current legal theory requiring managers to run
corporation for benefit of shareholders should be abandoned).
5. Gort & Hogarty, New Evidence on Mergers, 13 J.L. & EcoN. 167, 183 (1970).
6. See pp. 1248-51 infra.
7. See, e.g., M. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPORATION 79-84 (1976).
8. See Donaldson, supra note 3, at 121 (shareholders' risk standard formed from
perspective of diversified investor; managers' risk standard based on preserving individual
corporate entity and managers' goals).
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executive compensation plans and the psychological benefits that man-
agers gain as a result of their corporate positions.9 Diversification af-
fords an opportunity to improve managerial positions with respect to
both of these factors. By the use of portfolio theory,10 on the other
hand, it can be demonstrated that shareholders of acquiring com-
panies incur actual damages in the absence of benefits other than
diversification.
A. Portfolio Theory and Shareholders' Risks
Investment securities are analyzed in terms of two characteristics:
return and risk." The return to the investor from a stock is defined
as the cash dividends received plus any appreciation in market price
during the holding period. 2 The total risk associated with the return
from a security is due to the possibility that the actual return at the
end of the holding period will differ from the return expected at the
beginning of that period.' 3 This risk consists of two components:
market risk, or changes in returns due to general market fluctuation,
and firm-specific risk, or changes in returns due to factors peculiar to
the individual company.' 4 As most investors are risk-averse,' 5 they will
not accept additional risks without receiving increased returns. Since
risk and return are interdependent, the riskiness of a given security
will determine the return that investors expect to receive before they
will purchase that security.
Portfolio theory enables the investor to analyze the risks and returns
that he can expect to receive from a group, or portfolio, of securities
9. See R. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 305-12 (1945) (most
important nonfinancial incentive offered by large corporation is opportunity to satisfy
desire for personal power and prestige).
10. Portfolio theory is a commonly accepted method of financial analysis. See J. VAN
HORNE, supra note 4, at 5-6; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 364-77 (5th
ed. 1975). See generally H. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION (1959); W. SHARPE, PORT-
FOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970). For nontechnical explanations, see B. MALKIEL,
A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 182-86 (rev. ed. 1975); Bines, Modern Portfolio
Theory and Investment Management Law: Refinement of Legal Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L.
REv. 721, 734-50 (1976).
11. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 15.
12. Id. at 20.
13. Id. at 15. The larger the number of possible returns, the higher the risk of the
security. See Pogue S& Lall, Corporate Finance: An Overview, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 29 (S. Myers ed. 1976).
14. In financial theory, market risk is called systematic risk and firm-specific risk is
called unsystematic risk. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 61; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM,
supra note 10, at 659. For a thorough explanation aimed at the nonexpert investor, see B.
MALKIEL, supra note 10, at 187-94.
15. For most investors, satisfaction increases at a decreasing rate with successive ad-
ditions to wealth. By definition, these investors are risk-averse. See J. WESTON & E.
BRIGHAM, supra note 10, at 318-19.
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rather than from a single security.' 6 The expected return 17 from a
portfolio is measured by the weighted average' of the expected return
from each security contained in the portfolio. The risk of a portfolio,
however, is not measured by the weighted average of the risk of each
security, but is a function of the degree of correlation between the
fluctuations in returns from the securities in the portfolio.' 0 For ex-
ample, poor returns from umbrella companies due to abnormally sunny
weather will be offset by better than normal returns from suntan lotion
companies. This characteristic of a portfolio makes possible a reduc-
tion in risk without a reduction in the level of returns. As long as the
individual stocks in a portfolio do not possess identical risk-return
characteristics, the risk of such a diversified portfolio as a whole will be
less than the weighted average of the individual stocks of which it is
comprised. 20 The return from the portfolio, however, will continue to
be the weighted average of the individual returns.21
Once adequate diversification has been achieved,22 any return that
16. B. MALIEL, suPra note 10, at 182-86; see J. VAN HORNE, sutra note 4, at 50.
17. The expected return from a portfolio or a security is defined as the mean of the
probability distribution of all possible returns from that portfolio or security. See, e.g.,
Bines, supra note 10, at 735-38.
18. A weighted average is calculated by summing the products of the expected return
from each security and the proportion of funds invested in each security. See, e.g., J.
VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 48.
19.. Id. at 48-49. Securities with identical risk-return characteristics are perfectly posi-
tively correlated, that is, the returns from each stock fluctuate in the same direction at
all times. Securities that move in opposite directions at all times are perfectly negatively
correlated. Most stocks are less than perfectly positively correlated, that is, they respond
"neither entirely in phase nor entirely out of phase to events." Bines, supra note 10, at
746.
20. Pogue & Lall, supra note 13, at 30.
21. The risk-reduction benefits can be demonstrated by the following example: As-
sume that one stock, an umbrella company, yields 20% in rainy weather and 0% in
sunny weather, while another, a suntan lotion company, yields 20% in sunny weather
and 0% in rainy weather. If it is sunny 50% of the time and rainy 50% of the time, then
the expected annual return for each company is 10%. If an investor has a total of $100
to invest and places it all in the umbrella company, he can expect to receive, on average,
$10 per year. However, he faces the risk that in any given year the 50% probability of
rainy weather will not materialize. If one year it is sunny 75% of the time, the investor
will receive only $5. Now, suppose there is a second investor with $100 who invests $50
in the umbrella company and $50 in the suntan lotion company. His expected return is
$5 from each company for a total of $10. His risk, however, has been completely
eliminated; he will receive $10 regardless of what the weather pattern is in any given
year. If it is sunny 75% of the year, he will receive only $2.50 from the umbrella com-
pany. However, he will receive $7.50 from the suntan lotion company and, therefore, earn
his expected 10%. Clearly, this second investor has found a better deal. See B. MALKIEL,
supra note 10, at 183-85.
22. If it were possible to find two perfectly negatively correlated stocks, see note 19
supra, an investor would need to purchase only those two stocks in order to eliminate
all firm-specific fluctuations and achieve complete diversification. See B. MALKIEL, supra
note 10, at 185. Although two such stocks are virtually impossible to find, see id., the
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represents compensation for firm-specific23 risk will be quickly bid away
by rational investors24 who recognize the possibility of gain that exists
in eliminating the risk and maintaining the return by placing the
security within a portfolio. - However, the investor who has eliminated
firm-specific risk must still take market risk into account in evaluating
a security;20 some stocks are more volatile than others in relation to
the market index.27 Since market risk cannot be eliminated, the risk-
averse investor will require greater returns for stocks with higher
volatility.28 Thus, the return required from a security will be a function
of that security's market risk.
29
Since the rational investor always owns a diversified portfolio, the
wealth of that investor is maximized only if returns from a company
in which he owns stock are increased or market risk is decreased. The
reduction of firm-specific risk at the corporate level does not create
added value for him; the price of his shares already reflects all gains
obtainable through diversification.
B. Portfolio Theory and Managers' Risks
The principles of portfolio theory can also be employed to predict
managerial behavior under conditions of uncertainty.30 Most execu-
tives of publicly owned corporations are compensated for their work
by a base salary plus a bonus of cash, stock options, deferred compensa-
combination of 10 to 20 less than perfectly positively correlated stocks is adequate to ob-
tain sufficiently complete diversification, id. at 190; Markowitz, Markowitz Revisited,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., Sept-Oct. 1976, at 50.
23. See note 14 supra.
24. A rational investor is one who always seeks to maximize his expected returns for
the level of risk he is willing to assume. Although there may be nonrational investors in
the market, their responses and actions will be random and, hence, will not affect the
result arising from simultaneous actions by rational investors.
25. See B. MALKIEL, supra note 10, at 190 n.**; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note
10, at 377.
26. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 62-63. Even a well-diversified portfolio re-
mains exposed to market fluctuations. J. WVESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 10, at 659.
27. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 59-60; J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 10,
at 662.
28. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 64-65. Risk-averse investors require additional
returns for bearing added risks, but, as only market risk is relevant to well-diversified in-
vestors, they will require extra rewards solely for increases in such risks. Therefore, a
graphic representation of the relationship between the return from a security and its
market risk will be linear. Id. at 63.
29. Id. at 63-64.
30. Typically, portfolio theory has been applied to the risks incurred by shareholders
rather than by managers. See, e.g., W. SHARPE, supra note 10, at 96-103 (portfolio theory
used to delineate two kinds of risks associated with holding securities; firm-specific risk
and market risk); Bines, sutra note 10, at 750-97 (portfolio theory used to explore invest-
ment-fund manager's fiduciary duties to investors in selecting and adjusting fund's port-
folio).
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tion, or increased retirement benefits.3 1 The amount of the bonus is
generally based on the financial performance of the company during
the preceding fiscal year32 and it is intended to create incentives for
management to maximize corporate performance. 33 Since corporate
performance fluctuates with firm-specific variables, managers are sub-
jected to the same firm-specific risk, with respect to their corporate
compensation, 34 as is a hypothetical investor who holds the stock of
only that one company.
A predictable response by the risk-averse manager is diversification
of his investments in order to minimize the firm-specific risks associated
with his compensation.33 However, managers are unlikely to command
the amount of personal wealth necessary to obtain the minimal level of
diversification.3" Thus, unlike rational shareholders, they remain ex-
31. See D. McLAUGHLIN, THE EXECUTIVE MONEY MAP 122 & n.2 (1975) (detailed analysis
of proxy statements of 550 leading companies found that 76% of these companies had
bonus plans in 1973).
32. Id. at 128-37 (total amount available for payment of bonuses to all eligible execu-
tives is calculated, in 85% of companies surveyed, by fixed formula based on percentage
of profits).
33. Id. at 122. Empirical studies have concluded that executive compensation is more
closely tied to corporate sales than corporate profits. The distribution of the total pool
of funds among eligible executives can be based on a fixed or graduated percentage of
salary, on divisional performance, or on individual achievement. Id. at 127-30. However,
"[tihe final decisions in 95 companies out of 100 will be made on a judgmental basis,
regardless of the formal administrative system." Id. at 132. Therefore, the basis used by
top management in evaluating individual performance and setting bonuses is apparently
the level of and growth in sales. This is entirely consistent with the psychological factors
that lead managers to emphasize size and growth. See p. 1243 infra. For a survey of
the empirical studies, see S. REID, supra note 3, at 135-36. But see Lewellen & Hunts-
man, Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 710 (1970) (executive
compensation more strongly influenced by profit and stock performance than sales).
Bonuses range from 10% of a lower-echelon manager's salary up to 50% of the salary of
top executives. D. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 31, at 129.
34. See, e.g., D. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 31, at 130 (executive's compensation dropped
by 5400,000 when company failed to pay bonuses; average partner compensation in securi-
ties firm dropped from $124,000 to $25,000 in one year due to economic difficulties).
35. See J. MossIN, SECURITY PRICING THEORY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE IN-
VESTMENT DECISIONS 10 (1972) ("The investor may have various types of nonportfolio
income that are correlated with certain securities. An architect's professional income may
be closely correlated with earnings in the construction and building-materials industries.
A rational portfolio would in this case include relatively fewer shares in these industries.")
36. In order to obtain the minimal level of adequate diversification, the manager would
need to invest his money in at least nine other companies, all of which have returns that
are less than perfectly positively correlated with the variations in his compensation. Al-
though the amount of funds invested in each security to achieve adequate diversification
depends on a variety of factors, it is likely that the income streams from each investment
would need to be roughly equivalent to the amount of the bonus. At prevailing interest
rates, a manager receiving a bonus as modest as $50,000 would need several million
dollars of investment capital to eliminate the firm-specific risk resulting from his com-
pensation. Formulas for calculation of the exact amount of capital required are not
available from secondary sources but can be derived from the basic principles of portfolio
selection. See Bines, supra note 10, at 743-49.
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posed to the fluctuations in returns arising from the firm-specific risks
of their company.37
Managerial behavior is also influenced by factors other than firm-
specific risk. Managers gain psychological rewards from their positions
of authority within the corporation." Leadership of a successful com-
pany brings a manager power and prestige; 39 the possibility of losing
these benefits is regarded by managers as a traumatic experience. 40
Even a manager wealthy enough to eliminate the risk of his incentive
pay by diversification cannot reduce the possibility of loss of these
significant psychological benefits.
The only effective method of lessening the risks of unstable earnings
to managers is to diversify at the corporate level. 41 Diversification can
be achieved either by internal expansion into other product markets
or by the acquisition of companies involved in businesses unrelated to
that of the acquiring corporation. 42 In either case, managers are, in
essence, creating a portfolio of investments for the corporation as a
whole. This enables them to decrease the corporation's firm-specific
risk, and the concomitant risk associated with their own compensa-
tion. Moreover, psychological benefits increase with an increase in
size, because size adds to the longevity of the firm and reduces the
possibility of a takeover. Thus size adds to the job security of man-
agement.43 Moreover, managerial power and prestige increase with
37. If corporate profitability is improved through incentive plans, as some com-
mentators assert, see D. McLAUGHLIN, supra note 31, at 122; Masson, Executive Motiva-
tions, Earnings and Consequent Equity Performance, 79 J. POLITICAL ECON. 1278, 1285-90
(1971), then it is to shareholders' advantage that managers not diversify away the risk
built into their compensation plans through a personal portfolio. However, these risks
may lead managers to take other actions that are not in the best interests of shareholders.
See pp. 1243-44 infra; M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 30-31; J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW IN-
DUSTRIAL STATE 136-66 (3d ed. 1978).
38. R. GORDON, supra note 9, at 305-07.
39. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 31; R. GORDON, supra note 9, at 305-07.
40. James E. Ling, the chief executive officer of the conglomerate, Ling-Temco-Vought,
Inc., stated the reasons for his company's diversification program:
As late as 1964, 90% of LTV's business was committed to the military and space
agencies. The management of LTV had suffered a number of traumatic experiences
as the result of cutbacks in aircraft and missile programs. Thus, we were determined
that never again would we be dependent upon any one product, market or technology
to sustain our growth and progress.
E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 20 (1973) (emphasis added).
41. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 31; Donaldson, supra note 3, at 127; Mueller, A
Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 83 Q.J. ECON. 643, 657 (1969).
42. For reasons why internal diversification does not create the same dangers as diversi-
fication by acquisition, see note 76 infra.
43. Increased size means the controlling share of a company is more expensive and
thus may discourage potential acquirers. Decreased liquidity also reduces surplus funds
available to the acquirer once the transaction is completed. Both increasing size and re-
ducing liquidity are utilized as defensive strategies by potential target companies to de-
feat a takeover. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 36
(1978).
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the size of the corporation. 44 These psychological, as well as financial,
incentives cause management to favor corporate acquisition programs,
regardless of the effect of that policy on profitability.45
II. The Sources of Damage to Shareholders
Since investment decisions afford managers the opportunity for re-
ducing -the firm-specific risk to which they are subjected by execu-
tive compensation plans as well as for satisfying personal motivations, 46
and since the fastest method of achieving these goals is acquisition of
another company,47 acquisitions present the greatest source of possible
conflict with shareholder interests.48
A. The Costs of Acquisitions
Since rational shareholders have already eliminated firm-specific risk
through portfolio diversification, they gain nothing from the reduction
of that risk by a corporate acquisition.49 In order to benefit share-
holders, an acquisition must result in synergy.Y Synergy occurs when
the value of the companies combined is greater than the sum of the
44. See R. GorDoN, supra note 9, at 307 ("As in the case of personal power, prestige is
to some extent linked with the size of the firm, and too strong a desire for it may lead to
overexpansion."); Mueller, supra note 41, at 644 ("[T]he prestige and power which man-
agers derive from their occupations are directly related to the size and growth of the
company and not to its profitability.")
45. See S. REID, supra note 3, at 134-39; Mueller, supra note 41, at 656-57.
46. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 30-34; cf. Stapleton, Portfolio Analysis, Stock
Valuation and Capital Budgeting Decision Rules for Risky Projects, 26 J. FINANCE 95, 111-
17 (1971) (managers should consider only market risk in evaluating investment projects).
47. See J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICs AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 105-07 (1973); Mueller, supra
note 41, at 647-48, 657. Managers could also decrease their own firm-specific risks by in-
vesting corporate funds in the securities of other corporations. This would not only provide
risk reduction but would also permit managers to diversify without paying an acquisition
premium. But such a strategy, although attractive for risk-reduction purposes, is not often
observed in practice. Heavy investment in publicly traded securities would be a clear in-
dication that management has run out of high-yielding investment ideas for corporate
funds and is thus performing less than optimally. In addition, managers are, presumably,
better suited for running a business than managing an investment fund. Finally, a large
fund of liquid investments in other securities is a tempting asset to a potential hostile
acquirer.
48. S. REID, supra note 3, at 148; see E. KINTNER, supra note 40, at 24 (large merging
firms have exhibited tendency to achieve growth by merger even at cost to shareholders).
Diversification through internal expansion may also conflict with shareholder goals if it
provides no benefits above its cost. However, certain protections for shareholders are built
into the internal diversification process. See note 76 infra.
49. See J. MOssIN, supra note 35, at 9 (there is no need for individual company to
diversify as stockholders can do so on their own); Stapleton, supra note 46, at 111 ("The
company cannot benefit its shareholders by diversifying investments within the com-
pany."); cf. Salter & Weinhold, supra note 2, at 168-69 (systematic risk of conglomerate
differs insignificantly from that of comparable portfolio).
50. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 220-22, 632; Mueller, supra note 41, at 652-53.
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values of each company separately.5 1 This result is possible only if
operational or financial economies are produced by the combination.
52
Operational economies are the most common source of synergy, but
are usually available only in combinations of related businesses that
result in horizontal or vertical integration.53 Conglomerate acquisi-
tions, in which two unrelated businesses are combined, rarely produce
operating economies; 5 4 their only potential source of synergy is financial
economies, such as centralized cash balances, transfer of working-capital
funds among divisions, and reinvestment of excess funds internally. 55
51. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 630.
52. Id. at 630. The term "synergy," as defined here, does not include the misapplica-
tion of the word to illusory gains in earnings per share. In the 1960s, synergy was used
to describe the gain that occurred when a company with a high price-earnings ratio (P/E)
purchased a company with a low P/E. The "synergy" occurred because the earnings of
the acquired company were supposedly evaluated by the market at the acquirer's P/E
after the acquisition, producing a market value for the combined companies in excess of
the sum of their separate values. For a thorough explanation of the mechanics of this
process, see B. MALKIEL, supra note 10, at 56-60. This manufactured growth only works,
however, as long as acquisitions grow exponentially in each successive year, and as long
as the market does not discount the growth as illusory. For several years in the mid-
1960s, the market did not discount the growth and the value of actively merging firms
soared, perhaps under the "greater fool" theory. Id. at 60; see id. at 24 (no matter what
price one pays for stock, there is always someone else who will pay higher price).
By the late 1960s, conglomerates could no longer find the necessary volume of acquisi-
tions, nor could they always competently manage the disparate businesses they had al-
ready accumulated. By 1969, the market in conglomerate stock had plunged drastically.
See id. at 63. Today there is no longer any reason to believe that the market, even under
the greater fool theory, will find value in this false synergy. See Myers, A Framework for
Evaluating Mergers, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 640 (S. Myers
ed. 1976). The P/E ratio of the combined company will most likely be the weighted
average of the P/E's of each company prior to acquisition. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4,
at 639.
53. Operational economies arise if duplicate facilities, such as manufacturing, distri-
butional, or marketing networks, can be eliminated by means of a horizontal combination,
or if more control over the supply of raw materials or distribution of the end product can
be obtained by means of a vertical combination. For a detailed analysis of each category
of operating economy and the possibility of its realization, see Alberts, The Profitability
of Growth by Merger, in THE CORPORATE MERGER 247-62 (V. Alberts & J. Segall eds. 1966);
Myers, supra note 52, at 635-37.
54. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 630; Mueller, supra note 41, at 650-51.
55. See Levy & Sarnat, Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case for
Conglomerate Mergers, 25 J. FINANCE 795, 801 (1970); Mueller, supra note 41, at 651-53;
Salter & Weinhold, supra note 2, at 171-76. It has also been argued that the more stable
cash-flow stream produced by a diversifying or conglomerate merger creates added debt
capacity beyond the sum available to each company separately. See, e.g., Lewellen, A Pure
Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger, 26 J. FINANCE 521, 525-28 (1971). That
argument is founded on the concept that the debt capacity of a firm is a function of the
level and volatility of cash-flow streams. The level of the combined firm's cash flow is
simply the sum of each company's separate flows, but volatility, like the standard devia-
tion of a portfolio, has a covariance effect and is, therefore, less than the sum of the
volatility of each separate stream. See J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 221. This argu-
ment has been disputed by theorists who have pointed out that merger has the con-
sequence of removing the separate, limited liabilities of each firm. See Bierman & Thomas,
A Note on Mergers and Risk, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 523 (1974); Rubinstein, A Mean-Variance
Synthesis of Corporate Financial Theory, in MODERN DEVELOPMENTS IN FINANCIAL MAN-
AGEMENT, suPra note 52, at 54.
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Although it is often asserted that shareholders should be indifferent
toward a nonsynergistic merger, since the transaction is merely addi-
tive,56 there is both theoretical and empirical support for the contrary
position. In order to induce either controlling shareholders or a ma-
jority of the shareholders of widely held shares of a target company to
sell, a premium over the current market price must be offered.57 In
recent years, the size of premiums paid has risen dramatically." In
1977, the premium paid over the market value of the shares of the
acquired firm four weeks prior to announcement of the acquisition
averaged seventy-five percent for friendly offers and ninety-one percent
for offers made after competing bids.59 Of course, once such a premium
is paid, the acquirer's shareholders cannot gain from the acquisition in
the absence of synergistic benefits in excess of that premium.°0
The weight of empirical evidence supports a finding that the long-
run investment performance of actively acquiring companies is not
superior to that of nonacquiring companies: 6' acquisitions are not
justified by improved performance of the acquirer sufficient to out-
weigh the costs of these transactions. In fact, randomly selected diversi-
fied portfolios outperform conglomerates in terms of both rate of re-
turn on assets and accumulation of shareholder wealth. 2 Moreover,
the investment performance of the stock of active, industrial acquirers
is generally worse than the average investment performance of com-
panies in the industry in which the acquirer was originally cate-
gorized. 63 Thus, acquisitions are risky investments; some produce very
high longrun returns, but most do not.64 Empirical evidence also sug-
gests that the shortrun performance of an acquirer's stock is not
56. See U. REINHARDT, MERGERS AND CONSOLIDATIONS: A CORPORATE FINANCE APPROACH
47 (1972); Levy & Sarnat, supra note 55, at 796-99.
57. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 219, 638.
58. The lower premiums paid until recently may explain why the damage to acquirers'
shareholders has not been widely recognized. There is a greater possibility that synergistic
benefits will be sufficient to offset a 25% premium than a 90% premium.
59. Chatlos, The SEC vs. Investors on Tender Offers, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1978,
at 7.
60. J. VAN HORNE, supra note 4, at 219-20.
61. See pp. 1246-47 infra.
62. Mason & Goudzwaard, Performance of Conglomerate Firms: A Portfolio Approach,
31 J. FINANCE 39, 39, 45 (1976).
63. See Hogarty, The Profitability of Corporate Mergers, 43 J. Bus. 317, 325 (1970). In-
vestment performance is defined as returns to shareholders from dividends and apprecia-
tion in market value. Id. at 317 n.7. If synergistic benefits arise from the acquisition, the
gain to the corporation will be reflected in the price of the acquirer's shares. Id. at 318;
see R. BREALEY, SECURITY PRICES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET 55-56 (1971) (shareholders fare
better when growth arises from internal investment rather than by acquisition of another
company); S. REID, supra note 3, at 193-94, 228-31 (banks and other companies that grew
internally had significantly better profits than those that grew by merger).
64. Gort & Hogarty, supra note 5, at 176; Hogarty, supra note 63, at 326.
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adequate to offset the premium.", The value of acquirers' shares drops
an average of two percent at the announcement of an impending
acquisition. 0
The key variable that explains losses to the acquirers' shareholders is
the premium over market price paid to the shareholders of the target
company.67 The price of the acquirer's stock varies inversely with the
size of the premium.68 In fact, it appears that acquiring firms are
penalized by an amount greater than the actual premium paid, because
investors assume that the firm will overpay in subsequent transactions.0 9
Thus, the evidence indicates that "mergers tend to result in a net
transfer of wealth from the owners of buying firms to the owners of the
sellers." 70
B. The Failure of the Market for Corporate Control
The opportunity to sell shares in the marketplace is inadequate
protection for the shareholder dissatisfied with management actions.71
The market-for-corporate-control theory claims that the market serves
as protection in two ways: (1) as a medium for exchange, since a share-
holder can liquidate his investment at will; and (2) as a deterrent to
management, since poor management decisionmaking will result in
decreased share prices and thus increase the possibility of takeover by
another company.72
Both elements of this theory, however, are refuted by recent data.
First, the changed expectations of investors due to an announcement
of an acquisition is immediately compounded into the price of a
security by the actions of shareholders on the margin. 73 Only those
65. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1978, at 47, col. 3 (upon announcement of acquisition
with limited possibilities of synergy, acquirer's stock dropped 7%).
66. R. BREALEY, supra note 63, at 54-55. The same study found that the value of the
target's shares rose 13% in the month the announcement was made. Id.
67. Gort 8& Hogarty, supra note 5, at 177.
68. Kohers & Conn, The Effect of Merger Announcement on Share Prices of Acquiring
Firms, REv. Bus. & ECON. REsEARCH, Fall 1976, at 60-61. The authors found only four of
16 variables considered had a significant impact on share value, and that the stock price
varied inversely with three of them: amount of the premium, change in total assets, and
change in stability of earnings. Id. at 60; cf. Salter & Weinhold, supra note 2, at 169
("[T]he market may be more interested in growth and the productivity of invested capital
than in earnings stability per se.")
69. Gort & Hogarty, supra note 5, at 180.
70. Id. at 183.
71. For examples of this "market-for-corporate-control" argument, see Hetherington,
supra note 4, at 263-72; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J.
POLITICAL ECON. 110 (1965).
72. Hetherington, supra note 4, at 263-72; Manne, supra note 71, at 112-13.
73. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34, 38-39 (1965); see Note,
The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26
STAN. L. REv. 371, 387 n.83 (1974) (price figure for day or week accurately mirrors impact
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shareholders who have access to a constant and immediate flow of in-
formation can be sure of acting before the price has dropped. Second,
most targets of acquisitions are well-managed, profitable companies.7 4
In addition, it is difficult to see how the market will deter manage-
ment when any acquisition, regardless of its wisdom, discourages a
potential takeover by increasing the size of the company and decreasing
its liquidity.75
III. The Inadequacy of Current Law and a Proposal for Reform
A. Current Law
Because the marketplace provides inadequate protection for the
shareholder of an acquirer engaged in a nonsynergistic acquisition,"0
the law should provide a source of protection. At common law, there
are few judicial remedies available to the shareholder of an acquirer
who believes he has been damaged by a nonsynergistic acquisition.77
Acquisitions are rarely ultra vires;78 they are legal unless they are
of information during that period). Shareholders on the margin are active investors who
immediately react, by buying or selling shares, to any new information about the company.
Their actions ensure that the current market price of a stock reflects its intrinsic value
based on all available information. See B. MALKIEL, supra note 10, at 170-73.
74. See Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 6. See generally Dean & Smith, The Rela-
tionships Between Profitability and Size, in THE CORPORATE MERGER 12-13 (W. Albert &
J. Segall eds. 1966).
75. See note 43 supra.
76. Although internal expansion may present similar dangers, there is reason to believe
that these dangers will be less likely to materialize. Managers are likely to diversify into
a product line that they are familiar with and that is in some way compatible with the
company's existing business. Therefore, the possibilities of synergy, arising from the use
of either existing management knowledge or existing manufacturing, distributing, or
sales networks, are greater. In addition, no acquisition premium must be paid for internal
diversification. See Myers, supra note 52, at 635.
Furthermore, the process of internal expansion is gradual; the impact of the announce-
ment of internal diversification on the price of the shares is discounted and immediate
price changes are minimal. Cf. S. REID, suPra note 3, at 164 (in study of 478 large
American industrial firms from 1951 to 1961, those that expanded solely by internal
growth better served shareholder interests than those that grew by merger).
77. The lack of legal remedies for acquirers' shareholders arises from the belief that
little damage, other than dilution of ownership, will be incurred because shareholders
are free to sell their shares. This assumption is reflected in those state statutes that deny
appraisal rights to the shareholders of companies the stock of which is publicly traded in
an active market. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:
11-1 (West Supp. 1978); see M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 79-84 (criticizing such statutes
as failing to recognize that market does not always reflect fair value and that stock price
will be depressed immediately by news of ill-conceived structural change).
78. Most state statutes expressly grant corporations the right to purchase shares of
another corporation. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 202(a)(6) (McKinney 1963). Such a
statutory grant may authorize an acquisition regardless of the exact provisions of a com-
pany's certificate of incorporation. See Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 21941/77,
slip op. at 5-6 (Sup. CL, N.Y. Cty. Dec. 5, 1977), aff'd mem., 60 A.D.2d 552, 400 N.Y.S.2d
724 (1977).
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fraudulent, in violation of a relevant statutory provision, or a breach of
fiduciary duty.7 9 Since the decision to acquire another company for
diversification purposes rarely involves active fraud or statutory viola-
tion, 0 damaged shareholders must rely upon an allegation of a breach
of the fiduciary duty of managers as a means of challenging an acquisi-
tion.
Officers and directors of a corporation are required to exercise their
obligations in good faith and with the reasonable care of a prudent
man."' All actions must be in the interests of the corporation and not
for personal benefit.8s2 The level of scrutiny imposed by this standard
is severely restricted, however, by application of the business judgment
rule: a court will not substitute its judgment for that of the managers
when the wisdom, as opposed to the legality, of a decision is at issue. 3
The business judgment rule is based upon the assumption that, in the
absence of fraud or bad faith, shareholders are protected by economic
forces.
84
The only situation in which courts will regularly refuse to apply the
business judgment rule is when a conflict of interest is evident.8 5 This
occurs when the facts show a conflict between "forces tending towards
a decision for the advantage of all the shareholders and those tending to
the personal advantage of the directors."80 Courts will investigate such
transactions to ensure fairness unless there has been a ratification of
79. See Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 21941/77, slip op. at 3 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.
Cty. Dec. 15, 1977) (if proposed acquisition is not ultra vires or statutory violation, then
it will be deemed illegal only if shareholders can prove breach of fiduciary duty).
80. See Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973) (in order
to prove fraud, the discrepancy between price and value in proposed merger must be so
gross as to lead court to conclude that it was not due to honest error in judgment, but
rather to bad faith).
81. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717 (McKinney 1963); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 310
(West 1977) (procedures for validating transactions in which one or more directors had
conflict of interest). See generally H. BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 158 (1946);
H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusINss ENTERPRISES 453-59
(1970).
82. Vogel v. Lewis, 25 A.D.2d 212, 215, 268 N.Y.S.2d 237, 240-41 (1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d
589, 224 N.E.2d 738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1967); Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 678 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
83. In practice application of the doctrine is actually a determination either to review
a business decision in full or to grant summary judgment. Note, The Continuing
Viability of the Business Judgment Rule As a Guide for Judicial Restraint, 35 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 562, 564 (1967); see, e.g., Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 21941/77,
slip op. at 5 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cty. Dec. 15, 1977) (granting summary judgment to purchasing
corporation in suit alleging waste of corporate assets because shareholders did not estab-
lish material facts sufficient to justify trial on issue of breach of fiduciary duties).
84. Note, supra note 83, at 569.
85. Id. at 564; Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (when directors instituted
advertising campaign featuring wife of one director, court refused to investigate decision
to advertise but carefully scrutinized decision to hire wife because of possibility of con-
flict).
86. Note, supra note 83, at 564.
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management action by a majority of shareholders.87 Since courts will
not examine a decision to diversify in the absence of proof of fraud or
illegality,88 it is evident that they do not recognize that diversification
opportunities may work to the managers' personal advantage without
providing any corresponding advantage to the shareholders.
Most state statutes governing corporate mergers and consolidations
provide for approval by and appraisal rights for shareholders of the
surviving corporation, 9 but the number of business combinations to
which these statutes apply is limited.90 Recently, many states have
further restricted approval rights for acquirer's shareholders to transac-
tions in which the increase in shares resulting from an acquisition
equals twenty percent or more of the acquirer's previously outstanding
shares. 91 Therefore, the acquirer often has the power to determine the
approval rights of its shareholders by its choice of the format and
method of payment for an acquisition. 92
Under federal law, the Williams Act 3 governs tender-offer purchases,
which are outside the scope of state merger statutes. However, the
Williams Act focuses on protection of the target's shareholders and
offers little protection to the shareholders of the acquiring company. 94
87. H. BALLANTINE, supra note 81, at 176; H. HENN, supra note 81, at 469; see Note,
supra note 83, at 571.
88. See, e.g., Danziger v. Kennecott Copper Corp., No. 21941/77, slip op. at 4 (Sup.
Ct., N.Y. Cty. Dec. 15, 1977) ("It is not disputed that Kennecott's general goal of diversifica-
tion is a proper one, calculated to improve Kennecott's earnings.... It has not even been
suggested that Kennecott's officers and directors have approved the Carborundum pur-
chase offer in furtherance of some improper or illegal plan, or out of self-interest.")
89. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 262 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 903,
910 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
90. M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 215 & n.l. Most state statutes govern only the tradi-
tional formal merger or consolidation in which two companies join together to form a
single legal entity. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1978); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§§ 902, 903 (McKinney Supp. 1978).
91. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(8) (1978) (if amount of stock issued in merger or
consolidation exceeds 20% of shares outstanding immediately prior to effective date of
merger, acquirer's shareholders have approval rights); N.J. STAT. ANN., § 14:10-3(4)(b)
(West Supp. 1978) (approval rights for acquirer's shareholders if number of shares issued
exceeds 20% of number of shares outstanding prior to merger). See generally B. WASSER-
STEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE LAW 204-05 (1978).
92. See Farris v. Glen Alden Corp., 393 Pa. 427, 432, 143 A.2d 25, 28 (1958) (court
found transaction structured as sale of assets to be "de facto" merger; new accounting and
legal forms of corporate combination had been developed in order "to avoid the impact
of adverse, and to obtain the benefits of favorable, government regulations"). The dc
facto merger doctrine derived from Farris has been used by courts to thwart such at-
tempts to circumvent the requirements of merger statutes. See, e.g., Applestein v. United
Bd. & Carton Corp., 60 N.J. Super. 333, 159 A.2d 146 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1960), aff'd per
curiam, 33 N.J. 72, 161 A.2d 474 (1961).
93. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(i), 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976).
94. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 35, 42 (1977) (purpose of Williams
Act to protect shareholders of target companies and therefore no implied right of action
exists for parties outside protected class). See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (Rule lOb-5 does not create uniform federal law of fiduciary duty).
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In sum, the damaged shareholder must demonstrate his disapproval
of a diversifying acquisition by selling his shares. He is, therefore,
forced to take a loss in order to protect himself against management
actions that do not maximize shareholder wealth. The law should be
reformed to recognize this latent conflict between managerial motiva-
tions and the best interests of the shareholders.
B. A Proposal for Reform
There are three possible means of creating legal remedies for
damaged shareholders of an acquiring company: (1) state statutes re-
quiring approval, with accompanying disclosure and appraisal rights,
by the acquirer's shareholders; (2) federal legislation creating a cause
of action on behalf of the acquirer's shareholders or articulating federal
fiduciary standards; and (3) removal of the application of the business
judgment rule to acquisition decisions.
First, state-law approval rights could be granted to shareholders of
all companies involved in a business combination; such rights would
allow shareholders to protect themselves by refusing to ratify a non-
synergistic merger. There are, however, several drawbacks to such
statutory reforms. Since shareholders routinely ratify management
actions, 5 approval rights afford little actual protection. Appraisal rights
are similarly ineffectual; 90 the delay and expense for the acquirer in-
volved in approval and appraisal procedures would burden valid
transactions." Furthermore, given the difficulty of distinguishing bene-
ficial from nonbeneficial transactions without judicial factfinding,
there is no assurance that such procedures would produce economically
desirable results. Finally, disclosure of a potential acquirer's plans for
a target company to shareholders, pursuant to an approval procedure,
would give competing acquirers an undeserved advantage; farsighted
acquirers should retain the benefits of their synergistic acquisitions.
Second, even if the federal securities laws were extended to protect
the shareholders of acquirers, disclosure alone, without rights of ap-
proval, would only afford shareholders protection against procedural
irregularities.98 Management decisions will still be immune from sub-
stantive shareholder attack. Although substantive reform and expansion
of federal law is theoretically possible, the Supreme Court has indicated
an unwillingness to do so through judicial decision.99
95. Chirelstein, Corporate Law Reform, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 46-47 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
96. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 83 (characterizing appraisal rights as "remedy
of desperation").
97. See E. KINTNER, supra note 40, at 29-30; B. WASSERSTEIN, supra note 91, at 205-06.
98. See M. EISENBERC, supra note 7, at 35.
99. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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Substantive common law reform is most likely to provide adequate
shareholder protection. Such reform is consistent with the theoretical
basis of the business judgment rule, since the rule is not applied to
decisions made in conflict of interest situations. Because forces tend-
ing to the personal advantage of management exist in acquisition
decisions, such decisions, although not void per se, should be voidable
by a court upon proof of unfairness. 00 In establishing the fairness of an
acquisition, management should have the burden of proving that the
premium paid for the acquired company is justified by the existence of
some measurable benefit for shareholders.' 0 '
It is difficult to project accurately the benefits arising from an
acquisition. 0 2 However, in assessing the fairness of a transaction, it
would generally be possible for a court to determine whether the
shareholders of the acquiring company receive benefits in excess of
the price paid. There are certain "benefits" that are spurious and
should be rejected by a court. For example, "boot-strapping," manu-
facturing growth by continuous acquisition of companies with lower
price-earnings ratios than the acquirer,103 does not provide the share-
holder with real added value.'0 4 Diversification, or the reduction of risk
in order to stabilize earnings, similarly cannot justify an acquisition. 0 5
Other benefits may potentially create value for the acquirer's share-
holders but are unlikely to be realized in most situations. These gen-
erally unrealized benefits include transfer of competent management
to a currently mismanaged target company, 10 6 the investment of excess
funds, 0 7 and a reduced cost of capital due solely to the combination. 108
100. See Note, supra note 83, at 567-68.
101. See, e.g., Alcott v. Hyman, 208 A.2d 501 (Del. Ch. 1965).
102. See generally Alberts, supra note 53. One commentator has noted that the at-
mosphere of the market affects the investor's predictions about an acquisition: "In a bull
market, acquisitions are generally considered synergistic, and almost anything goes. In a
bear market the Street is antagonistic and just about nothing goes. In a chicken market,
the street is neurotic and it is anyone's guess what goes." Balog, Why the Stock Market
Reacts the Way It Does to Announcements of Mergers and Acquisitions, FINANCIAL ANAL-
ysrs J., Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 84, 87-88.
103. See note 52 supra.
104. See Myers, supra note 52, at 638-40.
105. Id. at 637-38.
106. See U. REINHARDT, supra note 56, at 4 (difficulty of managing widely diversified
and geographically dispersed conglomerate may well be such as to lead, on balance, to
negative synergism); Mueller, supra note 41, at 651-53 (managerial economies exist only
if managerial ability can be applied with equal success to unrelated businesses and if
managers of acquiring firm have greater abilities than managers of corporation they
acquired); cf. Wall St. J., Sept. 6, 1978, at 1, col. 6 (most recent acquisitions have been of
already well-managed firms, thus reducing possibility of managerial synergy).
107. See R. BREALEY, supra note 63, at 51 (price of company's stock better protected
by increase in dividends or repurchase of its own shares).
108. See U. REINHARDT, supra note 56, at 47 (in absence of other synergistic benefits,
reduced cost of capital is possible only to extent that there are imperfections in capital
markets; effect of those imperfections on cost of capital is extremely difficult to measure).
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On the other hand, the likelihood that production-oriented operating
economies and financial economies will result from an acquisition is
relatively easy to ascertain. For example, when companies are in related
businesses with compatible product lines, benefits from this com-
patibility should be evident in a thorough study of each company's
business. 0 9 Financial economies such as the use of previously unusable
tax-loss carryforwards or unutilized debt capacity" are readily ascer-
tainable by a financial analyst. Courts should evaluate claims of these
benefits in light of the facts of the particular case in order to determine
the likelihood that these benefits will materialize. If a court is satisfied
that benefits to shareholders from the acquisition exceed the total
costs, it may reasonably assume that the acquisition comports with
fiduciary standards.-"
The longrun effect of this common law reform would be to make
mergers very difficult to achieve. The antitrust laws substantially im-
pede all horizontal and vertical mergers,"12 which are the combinations
most likely to produce synergistic benefits. The reform suggested here
would prohibit all mergers that provide no benefit other than diversi-
fication. Thus, the only acquisitions that would be permitted would
be synergistic combinations of unrelated businesses. Such a result
would clearly be more beneficial to the economy as a whole than an
absolute prohibition of acquisitions by companies above a given size;"13
common law reform is best able to create the kind of protection that is
needed for acquirers' shareholders without impeding or prohibiting
those transactions that do maximize shareholder wealth.
109. For a discussion of potential merger benefits, see Myers, supra note 52, at 635-37.
110. The existence of these redundant assets is likely to be recognized by other po-
tential acquirers. Therefore, the price of the target may be quickly bid up beyond the
value of acquiring those assets. See id. at 636.
111. In fixing management compensation, boards of directors should bear these same
factors in mind. Bonuses should reward true operating performance gains, not growth
for growth's sake. Since diversification without synergy actually harms shareholders, pro-
viding reward for the execution of such transactions could, in fact, constitute a breach of
the board members' fiduciary duties.
112. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrTRusT 600-02, 657-61 (1977).
113. See Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1978, at 4, col. 2 (discussing proposals for prohibiting
mergers above given size).
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